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MICHAEL B. KELLY* 
Upon reading Brian Bix’s contribution,1 I decided to bring several 
decks of cards to the conference.  While Professor Bix offers several areas 
in which lawyers and legal academics might offer special insights into 
the discussion of marriage,2 those areas seemed largely descriptive or 
ministerial,3 not at all the kinds of questions the conference organizers 
asked us to explore.  My offer to deal the cards met a silent rejection—perhaps 
out of loyalty to the organizers, perhaps out of a desire to discuss the 
topics regardless of expertise, but perhaps out of a sense that we may 
have something more to offer than Professor Bix suggests.  These remarks 
seek to identify what, if anything, that special expertise might be. 
At the outset, let me acknowledge that I do not intend to contradict 
any argument Professor Bix raised.  For most of the questions raised in 
this conference, one could point to another academic discipline that 
might provide better research and analysis.  If the goals of marriage law 
turn on normative issues, philosophy (and theology) departments might 
provide more disciplined and informed reasoning on those questions.4  If 
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 1. Brian Bix, Everything I Know About Marriage I Learned from Law Professors, 
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 831–33. 
 3. Descriptive expertise included evaluating the interpretation or application of 
existing laws or constitutional limitations upon law.  Ministerial applications included 
ways in which changes to the law might be crafted—not quite a scrivener’s function, 
though tending in that direction.  To be sure, each of these tasks poses it challenges.  But 
legal academics striving for legitimacy among the scholarly departments of a university 
tend to see these aspects as the province of a trade school.  Our ambitions drive us to 
address the more interesting and complicated normative issues the organizers posed. 
 4. These comparisons assume the best contributions of each field. 




the goals turn on historical issues, history departments seem the logical 
source of sound reasoning and research.  If the goals turn on empirical 
questions about modern society, then psychology, sociology, economics, 
and even political science departments seem likely to bring more to bear 
on the issues than legal academics can muster. 
Nor are these concerns in any way limited to marriage or family law.5  
Labor law, antitrust law, consumer protection law, and any number of 
other subclassifications pose issues where the empirical, historical, and 
normative work of other departments might surpass that of legal 
academics.  The criticism, then, may be an indictment of the entire 
enterprise of law school, at least as a source of serious prescriptive 
scholarship. 
Rather than accept a seat in the gallery at these debates, however, I 
offer two roles that legal academics (and the professionals they teach) 
might play in addressing the issues raised at this conference.  In doing 
so, I do not contend that legal academics are uniquely well situated to 
serve these roles.  At a minimum, however, legal academics seem no 
worse than other disciplines at performing these roles.  While these roles 
may not entitle legal academics to dominate the table, at least they 
justify offering us a seat. 
Legal academics may help set the agenda for research in other 
disciplines.  In addressing any serious policy issue, the first question 
may be: “What do we want to know?”  What facts—historical, empirical, 
or normative—are pertinent to the issue?  Perhaps legal academics can 
raise the issue, can begin asking the questions that matter.  This 
conference could become an effort to identify the kinds of things we 
would like to know in deciding what the state’s interest in marriage 
really is and how best the definition of marriage might advance those 
interests.  Armed with the questions upon which policy depends, each 
discipline can proceed to produce the best answers available. 
Other disciplines, of course, can raise the issues on their own.  In 
some circumstances, other disciplines will recognize a problem long 
before lawyers or legal academics realize there is a question to be asked.  
Often, they will ask the right questions and generate sound research in 
response without a whisper from the law.  For two reasons, however, 
legal academics may add to this process. 
First, lawyers may help overcome parochialism in approach.  The data 
generated by any one discipline seems likely to emphasize the methods 
and outlook of that discipline.  Perhaps a voice outside the discipline 
might help broaden the inquiry.  By asking questions from a different 
perspective, legal academics may identify gaps in the knowledge 
 5. In this, too, I echo Professor Bix’s paper.  See Bix, supra note 1, at 827. 
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generated so far, encouraging additional research in areas that ultimately 
prove helpful. 
Second, lawyers may be among the first to recognize the need for 
investigation.  Particularly in family law, many changes (whether advances 
or not) have emerged from problems easily (perhaps first) identified in 
the study and practice of law.  For example, the impetus for no-fault 
divorce emerged in part as a response to all the ways lawyers devised to 
help clients divorce without legitimate grounds.6  Legal academics soon 
were aware of the farce,7 perhaps teaching the techniques to obtain a 
divorce without grounds.  Before long, the academy raised concerns 
about the nonsense created in an effort to prevent collusive divorces.8  
Perhaps other academic disciplines noted disingenuous techniques 
devised to help people sever unhappy marital ties.  Lawyers may not 
have been able to keep up the facade to the world, even if they could 
keep the court from penetrating far enough to deny relief.  But lawyers 
and legal academics likely were among the first to recognize the 
inconsistencies that entered into the law in an effort to maintain strict 
limits on divorce.  This seems likely to be true in many areas of family 
law.  The first signs will be noted by lawyers, professionals to whom 
people turn for help coping with the difficulties they face.  Legal 
academics, then, might be in a better position to set the agenda.  Even if 
all the data came from other departments, legal academics might have a 
role to play in setting the stage for reform. 
 6. For example, a false claim of adultery or cruelty, if not denied in answer to the 
complaint, might procure a divorce. 
 7. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 
J. FAM. L. 179, 182 (1968). 
As . . . has [been] pointed out for years, the divorce law on the books is 
often strict and complex while the law in actual practice is lenient in many 
states.  The story has been told many times.  Fictions, subterfuges, and 
outright perjury are resorted to, and divorce by mutual consent, prohibited 
by law, is a reality in fact. 
Id.  
 8. As Justice Traynor described the situation: 
Perhaps in no other area has the discrepancy between law in dogmatic 
theory and law in action, evading dogma by fiction and subterfuge, become 
so marked as in divorce law.  The withered doctrine that divorce can be 
granted only for marital fault, variously and eccentrically defined from state 
to state, is rendered still more irrational by the widespread rule that 
recrimination is an absolute defense.  The result has been a triumph, not for 
dogma, but for hypocrisy.  Rules insensitive to reality have been cynically 
circumvented by litigants and attorneys, with the tacit sanction of the courts. 
  Id. 




Legal academics also might synthesize the results produced by other 
disciplines.  As noted, the ideas that shape the definition of marriage may 
come from a number of different departments.  Someone will need to 
consolidate all of the useful contributions and make informed policy 
choices.  Of course, people trained in each discipline can discern quality better 
than outsiders.  But reliance on cross-trained scholars remains a dream, 
not a reality.  Professor Bix notes the dearth of academics cross-trained in 
law and history.9  Imagine, then, the number of academics cross-trained in 
law, history, economics, sociology, philosophy, and psychology—all 
among the departments that might bring serious research to bear on a 
question as far reaching as marriage.  Our policies will not be made by 
philosopher-historian-sociologist-psychologist-economist kings.  People 
far less expert will make the ultimate policy choices. 
Legal academics, of course, are not policy makers.  But legal 
academics train most policy makers.  Vast numbers of legislators 
have law degrees10—probably far more than have degrees in any other 
single discipline.  We may bemoan this fact, but at least for the time 
being we must consider its implications.  If policy makers are to learn to 
recognize good scholarship from bad, and synthesize the good into 
sound legal choices, they may need to learn it in law school.  Legal 
academics, thus, need to teach it and, presumably, practice it.  On this 
line of reasoning, our place at the table does not stem from our own 
qualities or special expertise.  Rather, it stems from our potential influence 
on others who also lack special expertise.  We teach the generalists how 
to generalize effectively.  Perhaps we had better become the best 
generalists we can—including through practice of it, such as this 
conference provides. 
A third role seems likely for lawyers and legal academics, though it is 
one that fits comfortably within the areas Professor Bix has already 
mentioned.11  Legal academics bring an expertise in law on the ground: 
the way courts, juries, clients, and other lawyers work in real legal 
disputes.  I earlier suggested this knowledge—more common in lawyers 
 9. Bix, supra note 1, at 829. 
 10. In the 107th Congress, 53 Senators (53%) and 158 (36%) 
Representatives were lawyers.  YourCongress.com, Lawyers in Congress, 
http://yourcongress.com/ViewArticle.asp?article_id=1671 (last visited Aug. 30, 
2005).  These numbers are somewhat lower than in 1989, when 63% of the Senate 
and 42% of the House were lawyers.  Mark C. Miller, Lawyers in Congress: What 
Difference does it Make? 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1 (1993), available at 
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/~kritzer/teaching/ls415/Miller1993CP.htm#AN96111
40405-3.  It is not entirely clear whether these statistics refer to self-identification 
(claiming lawyer as their principal occupation) or include all Members of 
Congress with legal training. 
 11. Bix, supra note 1, at 831–33.  
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than in legal academics—might help us set the agenda.  But it also helps 
the synthesizing of data into policy.  Or rather, it helps when the time 
comes to reduce policy into language that will affect behavior on the 
ground.  Knowing how people react to the language of legal rules, 
particularly as the language changes, will increase the ability to craft a 
statement of law that will effectuate the policy goal.  This may be more 
the scrivener’s role, for it lacks the glory of the grand policy discussion.  
Yet perhaps we need to remember that this skill, too, will be learned in 
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